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Abstract—While the existence of scheduler side-channels has
been demonstrated recently for fixed-priority real-time systems
(RTS), there have been no similar explorations for dynamic-
priority systems. The dynamic nature of such scheduling al-
gorithms, e.g., EDF, poses a significant challenge in this re-
gard. In this paper we demonstrate that side-channels exist in
dynamic priority real-time systems. Using this side-channel, our
proposed DyPS algorithm is able to effectively infer, with high
precision, critical task information from the vantage point of
an unprivileged (user space) task. Apart from demonstrating
the effectiveness of DyPS, we also explore the various factors
that impact such attack algorithms using a large number of
synthetic task sets. We also compare against the state-of-the-art
and demonstrate that our proposed DyPS algorithms outperform
the ScheduLeak algorithms in attacking the EDF RTS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increased deployment of safety-critical systems
with timing criticality (e.g., autonomous cars, delivery drones,
industrial robots, implantable medical devices, power grid
components), security for such systems becomes crucial. Until
recently, security has been an afterthought in the design of
real-time systems (RTS). However, the ever-increasing demand
for using commodity-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and
the demonstration of a variety of attacks against such systems
in the field [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] necessitates the
need for a better understanding and classification of security
threats aimed at RTS.
Side-channels that leak critical information about task be-
havior via system schedules in RTS has recently gained
attention, including methods to protect against them [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13]. In particular, the ScheduLeak algorithms [12]
demonstrate that scheduler side-channels can be exploited
by an unprivileged task (“observer task”) to leak important
information such as task arrival times in fixed-priority RTS (FP
RTS). This information was then used to predict future arrival
times of critical tasks (“victim tasks”). While the leakage of
such information seems to be subtle, knowledge about future
arrival times, especially for critical tasks, can help increase
the effectiveness of other attacks by filtering out noisy data
and extracting valuable information about the victim system.
In fact, these types of attacks fall into the broader category
of reconnaissance attacks. It has been shown that they can be
the stepping stone for more sophisticated attacks [14], [15].
For instance, the ScheduLeak paper demonstrated how cache
timing attacks or even the ability to take control of autonomous
drones become much simpler once the victim task’s future
behavior is made available to adversaries. One main drawback
of ScheduLeak is that it has only been demonstrated for FP
RTS. This significantly limits the types of systems where such
attacks can be launched. Directly applying ScheduLeak to
dynamic-priority RTS also does not work well — as evidenced
by the precision of inference (for EDF; the grey bars) in Figure
1. Hence, we need to develop algorithms that are targeted
towards dynamic-priority real-time systems.
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Figure 1: The results of employing the state-of-the-art
(ScheduLeak) and the proposed DyPS algorithms in the sched-
uler side-channel attack against the EDF RTS. The end (mean)
inference precision of ScheduLeak is 0.54 that is only slightly
better than a naive attack with random guesses.
One important challenge to leaking information via sched-
uler side-channels in dynamic priority RTS, e.g., the earliest-
deadline first (EDF) algorithm, is that (relative) task priorities
are not constant and vary at run-time. In the ScheduLeak
attack [12] that targets FP RTS, the observer task has a priority
lower than the victim task at all times. This determinism
ensures that the execution of the observer task is always
preempted or delayed by the victim task when both are ready
to run and this is vital for inferring the arrival times of
the victim. In contrast, in an EDF RTS, task priorities are
determined dynamically based on each job’s absolute/relative
deadline at each scheduling point. That is, no task will always
have a higher priority relative to another task in the system.
Hence, the ScheduLeak assumption about a persistent (rela-
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tive) priority relationship between any two tasks in the system
becomes invalid in EDF RTS. Consequently, the ScheduLeak
algorithms designed for FP RTS will fail (or have much lower
success rates) while dealing with EDF RTS.
We present the Dynamic-Priority ScheduLeak (DyPS) algo-
rithms that (a) demonstrate the existence of scheduler side-
channels in the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) scheduling
algorithm and (b) make use of such information to extract
critical task information. DyPS builds on top of ScheduLeak
but introduces additional steps and analyses to overcome the
challenges w.r.t. dynamic priority schedulers. We then present
our findings on how to craft effective attacks — that builds
upon the pairwise relationships between tasks in the system.
In addition, we also explore conditions that could limit the
scope of this attack. Finally, our evaluation demonstrates the
effectiveness of DyPS and also compares it to the state-of-the-
art (ScheduLeak) — we are able to match the performance of
ScheduLeak with a difference in precision of less than 0.1%.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
1) DyPS — a set of attack algorithms that overcome the
uncertainty in the EDF scheduling to accurately extract
critical task information from the scheduler side-channels
[Section III];
2) Analyses and metrics to understand the factors that can
influence an attacker’s ability to carry out a successful
DyPS attack [Section IV];
3) Comparison with the state-of-the-art scheduler side-
channel attack algorithms [Section V].
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. System Model
In this paper, a discrete time model [16] is consid-
ered. We assume that there exists a system timer (e.g., a
CLOCK MONOTONIC-based timer in Linux, a global tick counter
in FreeRTOS) that produces time ticks that the EDF scheduler
can use and that the tick count is an integer. We further
assume that a unit of time is equal to a time tick and all
system parameters are multiples of this time tick. We denote
an interval starting from time point a and ending at time point
b by [a, b) or [a, b− 1] (and hence its length equals b− a.)
We consider a uni-processor, single-core, preemptive,
dynamic-priority RTS running the EDF scheduling algorithm.
The system consists of n real-time tasks Γ = {τ1, τ2..., τn},
each of which can be either a periodic or a sporadic task1.
A task τi is modeled by Ci, Ti, Di, φi where Ci is the
worst-case execution time (WCET), Ti is the period (or the
minimum inter-arrival time for a sporadic task), Di is the
relative deadline and φi is the task phase2. We assume that
1A task may also be an aperiodic task. However, in systems like real-time
Linux (i.e., Linux with the PREEMPT RT patch), aperiodic tasks only get to
run in slack time (i.e., when no real-time tasks are in the ready queue). As a
result, aperiodic tasks do not influence how real-time tasks behave and thus
are ignored in this paper.
2The task phase is defined as the offset from the zero time point to any of
the task’s arrival time points projected on the period on the zero time point.
Thus, φi < Ti. It should not be confused with the arrival time point of the
task’s first job.
every task has a distinct period (or the minimum inter-arrival
time) and that Di = Ti [17]. We denote the k-th job of the task
τi by τki and it is modeled by c
k
i , a
k
i , s
k
i , d
k
i where c
k
i denotes
the execution time (cki ≤ Ci), aki is the absolute arrival time, ski
is the start time and dki is the absolute deadline. For simplicity,
we use ci, ai, si, di when referring to an arbitrary job of τi if
the job ordering is unimportant. Furthermore, we use “task”
and “job” interchangeably. In this paper, we only consider the
task set that is schedulable by the EDF scheduling algorithm.
Therefore,
∑
τi∈Γ
Ci
Ti
≤ 1. We assume that the task release
jitter is negligible, and thus ak+1i − aki = Ti for a periodic
task and ak+1i − aki ≥ Ti for a sporadic task.
In the EDF scheduling algorithm, a job with smaller abso-
lute deadline gets to run first and is considered to have higher
priority among other ready jobs that have greater absolute
deadlines. In the case that multiple jobs in the ready queue
have the same absolute deadline, they are considered to have
the same priority and the EDF scheduler randomly selects one
of the jobs to run. We define a task’s “execution interval” to
be an interval during which the task runs continuously.
B. Adversary Model
Similar to the adversary model introduced in existing work
on scheduler side-channels in RTS [12], [9], [13], we assume
that the attacker is interested in learning the task phase (and
then inferring the future arrival time points) of a critical,
periodic task (the victim task, denoted by τv) in the system.
This is considered to be part of a reconnaissance phase that
can be a part of a larger attack. Such an attack will benefit
from the inferences of the task’s future arrival time points.
The attacker launches the proposed DyPS attack algorithms
that exploit the scheduler side-channels using an unprivileged,
periodic task (the observer task, denoted by τo) running on the
same victim system. Once the inference of the victim task’s
phase is obtained, it is up to the attacker to decide if further
attacks should be launched using the same observer task or via
other attack surfaces. The ultimate goal of the attacks varies
with the adversaries. It has been shown that the inferred future
arrival time points can be used to help increase the success rate
of an attack (e.g., overriding the control of a rover system) or
filtering out noisy data while extracting valuable information
(e.g., monitoring the task’s execution behavior by using a
cache-timing side-channel attack) [12].
The DyPS attack requires only the observer task to ensure
the success for the attack algorithms introduced in this paper.
We assume that the observer task has access to a system timer
that has a resolution that is coarser than or equal to a time
tick. The observer task uses the timestamps read from such
a system timer to reconstruct its own execution intervals and
infer the victim task’s phase. However, this method only works
when the victim task has a priority higher than the observer
task [12, Theorem 1], which is not always true under the
EDF scheduling algorithm. More specifically, in the case of
EDF RTS, we are more interested in the priority relationships
between tasks at the instant when the victim task arrives. To
2
better clarify the relation between the observer task and the
victim task, we define the term “observability” as follows:
Definition 1. (Observability) A victim task’s arrival at av is
said to be observable by the observer task if the observer task
has a priority lower than the victim task at av . 
In an FP RTS, it is trivial to see that every arrival of the
victim task is observable by the observer task if the victim task
has a fixed, higher priority than the observer task. In an EDF
RTS, it depends on both the tasks’ periods and the absolute
deadlines at run-time. We first determine the observability of
a given observer and victim task pair by using the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. For the EDF scheduling algorithm, given an
observer task τo and a victim task τv whose periods are To
and Tv respectively and To 6= Tv , the victim task’s arrivals
may be observable by the observer task only if To > Tv .
Proof. Definition 1 for EDF means that the observer task has a
larger deadline when the victim task arrives. That is, ao ≤ av
and do > dv (or ao+To > av+Tv) for some jobs of τo and τv .
Rewriting the above deadline inequality as To−Tv > av−ao
indicates that To must be greater than Tv since av − ao ≥ 0.
Now let’s consider the case when To < Tv . It can be seen
that when both tasks arrive at the same time (which is the
case when the observer task has the largest possible deadline
relative to the victim task), the observer task still has a deadline
smaller than the victim task (i.e., ao = av and thus ao+To <
av + Tv ⇒ do < dv). Therefore, no victim task’s arrival can
be observed by the observer task if To < Tv . 
Based on Theorem 1, we make an assumption that the
observer task must have a period larger than the victim task
(i.e., To > Tv) in this paper.
III. THE SCHEDULER SIDE-CHANNELS IN EDF
The scheduler side-channels in the FP RTS enable an
unprivileged, low-priority task to learn precise timing infor-
mation of a periodic, critical task. Similar scheduler side-
channels exist in the EDF RTS due to the fact that both
types of RTS are preemption-based systems. However, because
of the dynamic nature, there are additional conditions and
restrictions to be considered for making the attack succeed
under the EDF scheduling algorithm. In this section, we
present these constraints along with the details of the proposed
DyPS algorithms.
A. Challenges and Overview
In this paper, the attacker’s goal is to infer the victim task’s
phase and then predict its future arrival time points. This is
achieved by allowing the observer task to reconstruct and
analyze its own execution intervals. When the victim task
arrives with a priority higher than the job of the observer task
that has been scheduled, the execution of the latter is either
delayed or preempted. As a result, the victim task’s execution
(including the arrival instant) is enclosed in the observer task’s
execution intervals. By reconstructing execution intervals for a
Observer	Task		𝜏,
Victim	Task		𝜏2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎2 observable
𝑎2𝑎,
𝑑2 𝑑,
(a) dv < do and thus av is observable by τo
Observer	Task		𝜏,
Victim	Task		𝜏2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎2 not	observable
𝑎2𝑎,
𝑑2𝑑,
(b) dv > do and thus av is not observable by τo
Figure 2: Examples of the two conditions (the victim task’s ar-
rival, av , being observable and not observable by the observer
task under the EDF scheduling) elaborated in Example 1.
sufficiently long duration (see Section V-C2 for the evaluation
of the attack duration), it is possible to infer the victim task’s
phase. Yet, even if we assume that To > Tv (Theorem 1) for
a given observer and victim task pair, it is not guaranteed that
every arrival of the victim task is observable by the observer
task due to the dynamic priority in EDF.
Example 1. Consider an observer task τo (To = 10, Co = 4)
and a victim task τv (Tv = 8, Cv = 2). Without making any
assumption on the task phases, Figure 2 demonstrates how
dynamic priorities impact the observability in EDF schedules.
In Figure 2(a), both τo and τv arrive at the same time point
(i.e., ao = av). Since τv has a higher priority (because dv <
do), the execution of τv delays τo that is supposed to start
at ao. As a result, the arrival at av can be observed by τo.
In Figure 2(b), τv arrives at a point when do < dv . As τo
is currently executing and has a higher priority at the arrival
point av , the execution of τv is delayed by the execution of
τo. Consequently, the observer task fails to observe the victim
task’s arrival at av . 
Apart from the fact that not all the observer task’s execution
intervals encapsulate the victim task’s arrivals, the above
example also hints at the fact that a part of an execution
interval may still be admissible even when such an execution
interval is considered invalid w.r.t. the observation of the victim
task’s arrivals. To illustrate, let’s consider the observer task’s
execution interval starting at ao in Figure 2(b). It is in fact safe
to leverage the first half of the execution interval to infer there
is no arrival. This is because if the victim task arrived within
this interval it would have higher priority (earlier deadline) and
would preempt the observer task. But considering the second
half of the execution interval to make the same inference
would cause a false negative observation (i.e., no arrival is
inferred while there is one) and mislead the attack results.
To identify the part of the execution interval that is valid for
observing the victim task’s arrivals, we present the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. For a given job of the observer task arriving at
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Compute	candidate	 time	slots3
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Figure 3: An overview of the attack steps in the DyPS
algorithms. The first two steps are specific to dealing with
the dynamic nature in EDF. Step 2 and 3 are identical to
ScheduLeak.
ao, only the execution interval(s) within [ao, ao + To − Tv) is
valid for observing the arrivals of the victim task.
Proof. The observer task may observe the victim task’s ar-
rivals if ao ≤ av and do > dv . However, it is unknown to
the attacker when a job of the victim task would arrive, so
the attacker must assume that the victim task may arrive at
any time point and exclude the part of the execution intervals
that may contain false information. For the jobs of τo whose
deadlines satisfy do > dv , all the execution intervals in such
jobs provide valid observations of the victim task’s arrivals.
That is, for a given ao of a job whose deadline meets do > dv ,
all the execution intervals within the range [ao, ao + To) are
valid. In contrast, when do ≤ dv , the execution of τo may
interfere3 with the victim task’s arrivals. From τo’s point of
view, the earliest victim task’s arrival that may be interfered
by τo occurs when do = dv and that arrival time point can be
represented by av = dv−Tv = do−Tv = ao+To−Tv . Hence,
it is possible for the observer task’s execution to interfere with
any arrivals of the victim task if the execution spans across
the time point ao + To − Tv . Therefore, only the execution
intervals within [ao, ao + To − Tv) is valid for the observer
task to observe the victim task’s arrivals. 
Using Theorem 2, it is possible for the observer task to
reconstruct only the valid part of the execution intervals.
However, the attacker may not directly use such a theorem as it
requires ao (or more precisely, the task phase φo) to be known.
If the attacker is already present when the system starts, φo
may be known to the attacker. However, in most attack cases
where the attacker enters the victim system after the system
starts, the attacker may not be able to easily learn the exact
value of φo without further reconnaissance. In such cases, the
attacker must first obtain φo before employing Theorem 2 and
proceeding to infer the victim task’s phase.
The rest of this section details every step of the proposed
DyPS algorithms that account for the aforementioned chal-
3By “τi interferes with an arrival of τj” we mean that τi has a priority
higher than τj at the arrival point of τj and hence the start of τj will be
delayed by the execution of τi.
lenges. An overview of the attack steps is shown in Figure 3
and we present a brief description for the goal in each step.
Note that the first two steps are unique to DyPS for tackling the
dynamic nature in EDF, while the last two steps are identical
to ScheduLeak [12], since we build on top of it.
[Step 1] Reconstruct φo: the first step is to reconstruct the
observer task’s phase in order to identify the range specified
in Theorem 2. [Section III-B]
[Step 2] Reconstruct execution intervals: with the recon-
structed φo, the observer task then is able to reconstruct only
the valid part of the execution intervals for observing the
victim task’s arrivals. [Section III-C]
[Step 3] Compute candidates: the observer task analyzes the
reconstructed execution intervals and compute a list of time
points as candidates for the final inference. [Section III-D]
[Step 4] Infer φv and predict future av: a time point is selected
from the candidate list as the inference of the victim task’s
phase. A future arrival time point of the victim task can then
be predicted by using the inferred task phase. [Section III-E]
B. Reconstructing The Observer Task’s Phase
Reconstructing the observer task’s phase, φo, can be carried
out by the observer task itself. When a new job of the observer
task is scheduled to run, ao is unknown since there might be
higher priority tasks delaying the observer task’s execution.
However, what the observer task itself can learn is the job’s
start time si (by reading the time stamp right as the job starts)
which is bounded by ao ≤ so ≤ do − Co. Let φ˜o be the
reconstructed task phase of the observer task. For a given job,
we may compute φ˜o from the start time so by
φ˜o = so mod To (1)
where To is known to the attacker. Intuitively, the closer so
is to ao, the more accurate φ˜o will be. By collecting and
examining more start times, the attacker may further improve
φ˜o by first determining the closest so to ao and then computing
φ˜o using Equation 1. When there exists one job whose so is
equal to ao, the correct task phase can be reconstructed (i.e.,
φ˜o = φo). In Section IV-A we discuss the factors that impact
the reconstruction of the task phase and how likely it is for the
attacker (observer task) to observe a situation where so = ao
in a given task set. We now formally describes the algorithms.
Consider the observer task launching the attack on its k-th
job (k is an arbitrary number that is unknown to the attacker)
and collecting its own job start times for m jobs. What the
observer task captures is a set of start times of consecutive
jobs Sobservedo = {sko , sk+1o , ..., sk+m−1o }. Our goal is to find
the start time that is closest to its arrival time. We do this by
comparing the start times using the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given two start times sko and sk+po where p ≥ 1
and thus sko < s
k+p
o , we can determine the start time that is
closer to its arrival time to be{
sko if s
k
o < s
k+p
o − p · To
sk+po otherwise.
(2)
4
where To and p are known. 
In the above proposition, the given start time pair, sko and
sk+po , represents two jobs differing in p periods. Therefore, the
start time of the (k+p)-th job can be shifted to the same period
as the k-th job by sk+po −p ·To since the observer task arrives
periodically (i.e., ako = a
k+p
o −p ·To). As a result, the two start
times in the same period (sko and the shifted s
k+p
o −p ·To) are
comparable. The smaller one is closer to its arrival time since
ao ≤ so.
By employing Proposition 1, we can determine the start time
that is closest to its arrival time using Sobservedo . The inference
of the task phase for the observer task is computed by
φ˜o = min(s
k+p
o − p · To | 0 ≤ p < m) mod To (3)
where To is the period known to the attacker and k can be
unknown. Then, given a start time so, the attacker can compute
its projected arrival time a˜o by
a˜o = so − j˜o (4)
where j˜o = (so− φ˜o) mod To represents the delay such a job
may have experienced.
Example 2. Consider the observer task τo in a task set of
4 periodic tasks (extended from Example 1) as shown in the
table below.
Ti Ci φi
τ1 15 1 3
τo 10 4 1
τv 8 2 2
τ4 6 1 4
Let’s assume the system begins at t = 0 and the
observer task starts collecting its start times for 10 in-
stances from t = 41. The collected start times are
{41, 53, 61, 71, 81, 92, 101, 111, 121, 133}. By using Equa-
tion 3, the observer task’s phase φ˜o can be computed by
min(41, 43, 41, 41, 41, 42, 41, 41, 41, 43) mod 10 = 1. In this
example, φ˜o = φo = 1 and thus the correct observer task’s
phase is obtained. 
C. Reconstructing The Observer Task’s Execution Intervals
Based on Theorem 2 and Equation 4, we developed the
following proposition to reconstruct the execution intervals in
a period:
Proposition 2. Assume that, in a DyPS attack, the attacker
has reconstructed the observer task’s phase as φ˜o. Then, for a
given job of the observer task starting at so, the observer task
reconstructs only the execution intervals within [a˜o, a˜o+To−
Tv) where a˜o is calculated using Equation 4. 
To implement Proposition 2, we employ a known recon-
struction algorithm [12, Algorithm 1] but make the following
modifications: (i) at the beginning of the execution of each pe-
riod, we let the observer task compute a˜o by using Equation 4;
(ii) the observer task stops reconstructing execution intervals
in a period if the current time stamp exceeds a˜o + To − Tv .
The end result of this step is a set of reconstructed exe-
cution intervals, denoted by Erecono = {e1o, e2o, e3o, ...} where
ero := [begin
r
o, end
r
o) is the r-th reconstructed execution
interval starting at the time point beginro and ending at the time
point endro. Note that the number of reconstructed execution
intervals are dependent on the duration of the attack that is
determined by the attacker. The impact of the attack duration
is evaluated in Section V-C2.
D. Computing The Candidates
To compute the candidate time points for the phase of the
victim task, the reconstructed execution intervals are organized
on a timeline with length equal to the victim task’s period
Tv . To facilitate understanding, let us use the schedule ladder
diagram [12] (of width Tv) to illustrate how the reconstructed
execution intervals are processed. On a schedule ladder di-
agram, the victim task’s arrivals are always present in the
same column (since the width equals Tv .) Let’s define such a
column as the “true arrival column” that has an offset of φv
from the leftmost time column. As the reconstructed execution
intervals of τo are ensured to have priorities lower than the
victim task, those execution intervals will not appear in the true
arrival column (because otherwise the victim task would have
executed instead). In other words, the time columns where
the reconstructed execution intervals of τo appear even once
cannot be the true arrival column.
Given a reconstructed execution interval ero ∈ Erecono ,
the time columns where ero is present are determined by
{t mod Tv | beginro ≤ t < endro ∧ t ∈ Z}. For simplicity,
let’s define ero mod Tv := {t mod Tv | beginro ≤ t <
endro ∧ t ∈ Z}. Therefore, the time columns where the
reconstructed execution intervals appear at least once can be
calculated by
⋃
ero∈Erecono (e
r
o mod Tv) which represents a set
of “false” time columns that do not include the true arrival
time column. Thus, the set of candidate time columns can be
obtained by
{col | 0 ≤ col < Tv ∧ col ∈ Z} −
⋃
ero∈Erecono
(ero mod Tv) (5)
E. Inferring The Victim Task’s Phase
Next, we take the beginning of the longest contiguous time
columns in the candidate list as the inference of the victim
task’s phase, φ˜v . Then, the future arrival time of the victim task
can be calculated by φ˜v +k ·Tv where k is the desired arrival
number. Alternatively, given a time point t, the subsequent
arrival time of the victim task can be predicted by
t+ (φ˜v − t) mod Tv (6)
Example 3. Let’s consider the task set from Example 2.
Assume that the observer task has collected its execution
intervals for a duration of LCM(To, Tv)4 (i.e., 40 time units in
this example) since the job starts at t = 41. The reconstructed
execution intervals are Erecono = {[41, 42), [61, 63), [71, 73)}
and they correspond to the time columns {1}, {5, 6} and
4As we will see in Section V-C2, the attack duration is evaluated with using
LCM(To, Tv) as an unit since the offset between the arrivals of τo and τv
resets every LCM(To, Tv).
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Figure 4: A schedule ladder diagram demonstrated for Exam-
ple 3. Both valid and invalid execution intervals are plotted in
the diagram for reference. In the DyPS algorithms, only the
valid execution intervals are taken into account for inferring
the victim task’s phase (Proposition 2.)
{0, 7}, respectively. Figure 4 displays the reconstructed execu-
tion intervals on a schedule ladder diagram and the timeline at
the bottom shows the union of the time columns, {0, 1, 5, 6, 7},
in which the reconstructed execution intervals appear at least
once. The candidate time columns are then computed as
{0, ..., 7} − {0, 1, 5, 6, 7} = {2, 3, 4} (Equation 5) and the
inference is determined as φ˜v = 2 (i.e., the first time column of
the longest contiguous time columns, {2, 3, 4}) which matches
the ground truth, φv = 2. 
It is worth mentioning that the correct φv may not be
inferred in Example 3 if Proposition 2 is not enforced. If all the
execution intervals (both valid and invalid execution intervals
in Figure 4) are considered when calculating the union of the
time columns, the true arrival column will be excluded from
the candidate time columns.
The aforementioned situation may happen if an incorrect
task phase for the observer task is reconstructed in the first
place. While it may cause some issues when φ˜o 6= φo, our
analysis in Section IV-A shows that it can happen only under
certain rare conditions. The experimental results presented
in Section V-C1 further show that the attacker can get a
high inference precision even in those conditions due to the
presence of run-time variations.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Impact on The Reconstruction of Observer Task’s Phase
In Section III-B we presented algorithms that can recon-
struct the observer task’s phase by using the start times of its
own jobs. When there exists at least one job of the observer
task whose arrival time equals its start time (i.e., the job is
not delayed by any higher priority task and thus ao = so), the
correct task phase can be reconstructed. On the other hand, the
correct inference cannot be made if the start of the observer
task jobs consistently experience delays in every period. Here
we explore and characterize the factors that may contribute
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Figure 5: An example of the arrival time correlation between
τo and τ1 for Theorem 3. In this example, an observer
task τo (To = 10) and a periodic task τ1 (T1 = 8) are
considered. It shows that the projected arrivals of τo appear
every σ(To, T1)T1 = 2 time columns.
to the delays in the observer task’s start times by analyzing a
simple task set with just two tasks.
Theorem 3. Given an observer task τo and a periodic task
τi, the maximum proportion of the arrivals of τo that may
experience interference solely due to task τi is computed by
ψ(τo, τi) =
⌈
ui
σ(τo,τi)
⌉
σ(τo,τi) (7)
where ui = CiTi is the utilization of τi, σ(τo,τi) =
To
LCM(To,Ti)
is the inverse of the number of the arrivals of τo in a
LCM(To, Ti) and the resulting ψ(τo, τi) is a fraction in the
range 0 < ψ(τo, τi) ≤ 1.
Proof. Since both tasks are periodic, the schedule of the two
tasks repeats after their least common multiple, LCM(To, Ti).
There are LCM(To,Ti)To arrivals of τo in a LCM(To, Ti). By
projecting these arrivals of τo onto a timeline with length
equal to the period of τi, an arrival of τo appears every
1
LCM(To,Ti)
To
· Ti = σ(τo,τi)Ti time units and repeats after each
LCM(To, Ti) [12, Observation 2], as illustrated in Figure 5.
The most number of arrivals of τo that may experience
interference due to the execution of τi in one LCM(To, Ti) is
computed by
⌈
Ci
σ(τo,τi)Ti
⌉
=
⌈
ui
σ(τo,τi)
⌉
which happens when
there exists an instant at which both tasks arrive at the same
time, e.g., when φo = φi or (φo mod Ti) = φi. In this
case, the maximum proportion of the arrivals of τo may be
interfered by τi in one LCM(To, Ti) can be computed by
ψ(τo, τi) =
⌈
ui
σ(τo,τi)
⌉
σ(τo,τi). Since this relation is the same
across all LCM(To, Ti), the calculated ψ(τo, τi) applies to the
whole schedule. 
When ψ(τo, τi) < 1, it means that at least 1− ψ(τo, τi) of
the arrivals of τo are not interfered by τi. In contrast, when
ψ(τo, τi) = 1, it is possible for the execution of τi to interfere
all the arrivals of τo, which would result in an inaccurate φ˜o.
Intuitively, it can happen when τi has a period in harmony
with that of τo. An example is given below.
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Observer	Task		𝜏,		(𝜙, = 1)
Harmonic	Task		𝜏8		(𝜙8 = 0) 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇,
𝑇8𝑎,8
𝑎88
(a) When φ1 = 0 and φo = 1, all the arrivals of τo experience interference due to the harmonic task τ1.
Observer	Task		𝜏,		(𝜙, = 2)
Harmonic	Task		𝜏8		(𝜙8 = 0) 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇,
𝑇8𝑎,8
𝑎88
(b) When φ1 = 0 and φo = 2, no arrival of τo experiences interference due to the harmonic task τ1.
Figure 6: Schedules of the task set Γ = {τo, τ1} given in Example 4. The To and Ti are in harmony and thus ψ(τo, τ1) = 1.
Example 4. Consider an observer task τo (To = 10, Co = 4)
and a task τ1 (T1 = 5, C1 = 2). The two tasks are in harmony
because To mod T1 = 0. Then ψ(τo, τ1) is computed by
σ(τo,τ1) =
To
LCM(To, T1)
= 1
ψ(τo, τ1) =
⌈
u1
σ(τo,τ1)
⌉
σ(τo,τ1) = du1e = 1
which indicates that all the arrivals of τo may experience
interference due to τ1. Figure 6 illustrates two possible sched-
ules for the given task set. Figure 6(a) shows the case where
φo = 1 and φ1 = 0, all the arrivals of τo are interfered by τ1.
Figure 6(b) shows the case where φo = 2 and φ1 = 0, all the
arrivals of τo are no longer interfered by τ1. 
This example shows a crucial fact that ψ(τo, τi) only
represents the upper bound of the interference (when only one
task is considered). That is, having ψ(τo, τi) = 1 does not
mean all the arrivals of τo are absolutely interfered. With the
same task set but different task phases (which can vary across
systems and every time the system restarts), the impact of the
interference can be quite different, as shown in Example 6.
On the other hand, the schedules presented in Figure 6 are
generated based on WCETs. However, the actual execution
times at run-time in real systems can vary throughout. As
a result, the run-time task utilization is in fact smaller and,
based on Equation 7, the proportion of arrivals of the observer
task is also smaller. Taking the schedule in Figure 6(a) as an
example, if the first instance’s execution time of τ1 is c11 = 1
(rather than its WCET), then the arrival a1o of the observer task
will not experience any interference. In such a case, s1o = a
1
o
and reconstructing the correct task phase becomes possible.
Therefore, the actual impact is highly dependent on the task
phases as well as the run-time variations.
B. Coverage Ratio in EDF
The coverage ratio C(τo, τv) = CoGCD(To,Tv) [12, Definition
1] is used to estimate the proportion of the time columns that
can be covered by the execution of the observer task in the
FP RTS. When a given observer task and victim task pair
satisfies C(τo, τv) ≥ 1, the execution of the observer task may
cover all the time columns on the schedule ladder diagram
and observing the victim task’s arrivals is possible. Since the
coverage ratio and the inference precision have a positive
correlation, it is useful for evaluating the attacker’s capabilities
against the victim task. While the idea of the coverage ratio can
be applied in the case of DyPS, the calculation must be revised
to reflect the scope of the reconstructed execution intervals
specified in Proposition 2 before it can be used. Therefore,
we redefine the the coverage ratio for DyPS as follows:
Definition 2. (CDyPS(τo, τv) DyPS Coverage Ratio) The
coverage ratio of DyPS in EDF, denoted by CDyPS(τo, τv),
is computed by
CDyPS(τo, τv) =
min(Co, To − Tv)
GCD(To, Tv)
(8)
It represents the proportion of the time columns where the
observer task’s (valid) execution can potentially be present
in the schedule ladder diagram. If all Tv time columns can
be covered by the observer task, then CDyPS(τo, τv) ≥ 1.
Otherwise 0 < CDyPS(τo, τv) < 1. 
V. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Metrics
There are mainly two attack stages in the DyPS algorithms:
(i) reconstructing φo for determining valid execution intervals
and (ii) inferring φv for predicting future arrival time points.
While both stages target the computing of a task’s phase, they
have very different characteristics due to how they are inferred.
We use two different metrics to evaluate the results from the
two stages as defined next.
1) Reconstructing The Observer Task Phase φo: As intro-
duced in Section III-B, the observer task’s phase is recon-
structed based on the collected start times where so ≥ ao (i.e.,
the start times are always on the right of the corresponding
arrival times), thus the distance between φ˜o and φo, denoted
by ∆φ˜o = (φ˜o − φo) mod To, should always be positive.
Based on this fact, we define the error ratio for φ˜o as follows:
7
Definition 3. (Eo Error Ratio of φ˜o) The error ratio of φ˜o,
denoted by Eo, is computed by
Eo =
∆φ˜o
To
(9)
where ∆φ˜o = (φ˜o − φo) mod To represents the distance
between φo and a projected φ˜o on its right. The resulting Eo
value is a real number in the range 0 ≤ Eo ≤ 1. A smaller Eo
means that the reconstructed φ˜o has less error when compared
to the true φo. 
Note that Eo is bounded by 1 because the start times used
for computing φ˜o are bounded by ao ≤ so < ao + To.
2) Inferring The Victim Task Phase φv: The second stage of
the attack in DyPS is to infer the task phase of the victim task.
In contrast to the observer task’s phase, we are only concerned
with how close the inference φ˜v is to the actual φv and φ˜v can
be on either side of φv . Inference precision [12, Definition 2]
of φ˜v was introduced to evaluate the effectiveness of scheduler
side-channel attacks. Here, we use the same metric but with
a clearer equation for evaluation. The metric is defined as
follows.
Definition 4. (Iov Inference Precision of φ˜v) The inference
precision, denoted by Iov , is computed by
Iov =
∣∣∣∣∣ Tv
2
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (10)
where  =
∣∣∣φ˜v − φv∣∣∣. The resulting Iov value is a real number
in the range 0 ≤ Iov ≤ 1. A larger Iov indicates that the inference
φ˜v is more precise in inferring φv . 
B. Evaluation Setup
The DyPS algorithms are tested using synthetic task sets that
are grouped by utilization from {[0.001+0.1 ·x, 0.1+0.1 ·x) |
0 ≤ x ≤ 9 ∧ x ∈ Z}. Each group contains 6 subgroups
that have a fixed number of tasks from {5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15}. A
total of 100 task sets are generated for each subgroup. The
utilization of each individual task in a task set is generated
from a uniform distribution by using the UUniFast algorithm
[18]. For each task in a task set, the period Ti is randomly
drawn from [100, 1000] and the worst-case execution time Ci
is computed based on the generated task utilization and period.
The task phase is randomly selected from [0, Ti).
The observer task and the victim task in a task set are
selected from the generated tasks based on the task periods.
To illustrate, let us consider a task set consisting of n tasks
Γ = {τ1, τ2, ...τn} whose task IDs are ordered by their periods
(i.e., T1 > T2 > ... > Tn). The observer task is then selected
as the (
⌊
n
3
⌋
+ 1)-th task and the victim task is selected as
the (n− ⌊n3 ⌋)-th task. This assignment ensures that To > Tv
(an assumption from Theorem 1) and that there exist other
tasks with diverse periods (i.e., some with smaller periods and
some with larger periods compared to To and Tv .) The task
sets are generated with CDyPS ≥ 1 (except for the experiment
that evaluates the impact of the DyPS coverage ratio). It is to
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Figure 7: The number of start times the DyPS algorithms needs
for processing each of the 6000 task sets (without harmonic
tasks) to get the observer task’s correct phase. Each dot in the
figure represents the result of a task set. It shows that more
start times are needed when the task set utilization is higher.
Yet, the worst case (i.e., 15 start times which corresponds to
15 · To attack duration) is reasonably small and manageable.
examine the performance of the DyPS algorithms under the
best case (i.e., all Tv time columns on the schedule ladder
diagram may be covered by the observer task’s execution.)
In each task set, 50% of the tasks are configured as sporadic
tasks and the rest are periodic tasks. Thus, there are
⌊
n
2
⌋
sporadic tasks in each task set. The generated task periods are
used as the minimum inter-arrival times for the sporadic tasks.
To vary the inter-arrival times for the sporadic tasks at run-
time, we use a Poisson distribution in which the probability
of each drawn occurrence (i.e., each inter-arrival time) is
independent. During the simulation, a Poisson distribution
with λ = Ti · 120% as its mean value is used to generate the
different inter-arrival times for a sporadic task τi. To satisfy
the given minimum inter-arrival time, we adjust the varied
inter-arrival time to be Ti if it becomes smaller than Ti.
To generate the different task execution times at run-time, a
normal distribution is employed. For a task τi, we fit a normal
distribution N (µ = Ci · 80%, σ2) with which the cumulative
probability for ci ≤ Ci is 99.99%. When a generated execution
time exceeds its Ci, we adjust it to be Ci to ensure the
schedulability of the task set.
C. Simulation Results
1) Reconstructing The Observer Task’s Phase φo: As in-
troduced in Section III-B, the observer task’s phase has to be
reconstructed before inferring the victim task’s phase. There-
fore, we evaluate the factors that impact the reconstruction of
the observer task’s phase.
We first test the DyPS algorithms without any tasks that are
in harmony with the observer task. The result shows that the
correct φo (i.e., φ˜o = φo or Eo = 0) can be reconstructed
in all of the tested 6000 task sets (without harmonic tasks).
The number of start times that the DyPS algorithms process
to get Eo = 0 is plotted in Figure 7. The figure shows a
trend that it requires more start times for the DyPS algorithms
to reconstruct correct φo when the utilization is higher. This
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Figure 8: The impact of the start time delays caused by the
tasks in harmony with the observer task on error ratio. The
tested 6000 task sets are generated with at least one task in
harmony with the observer task in each task set. The X-axis
is the ratio of the estimated start time delays introduced by
the harmonic tasks and the observer task’s period and the Y-
axis is the error ratio. Each task set is tested with run-time
variations and without run-time variations. The results show
that the impact of the start time delays becomes subtle in the
presence of run-time variations.
is because a higher utilization implies higher chances of
preemptions and delays in task executions. Nevertheless, even
in the worst case, of 6000 tested task sets, a reasonably small
number of start times were required (i.e., 15 start times). This
shows that the DyPS algorithms are practical for reconstructing
φo.
Next we evaluate the impact of harmonic tasks. As pointed
out in Section IV-A, a task with a period that is in harmony
with the period of the observer task can contribute a con-
stant delay to the observer task’s start times. Therefore, we
regenerate 6000 task sets with at least one task in harmony
with the observer task in each task set and test with the DyPS
algorithms. In this experiment, we let the DyPS algorithms
collect start times within a duration of 10 ·LCM(To, Tv) (see
Section V-C2 for the explanation for the chosen duration).
Each task set is tested with two conditions: (i) without run-time
variations and (ii) with run-time variations. It is to examine
the impact of the constant delay caused by the harmonic
tasks in both a static and a more realistic RTS environment.
Without run-time variations, the task’s execution times will
run up to the WCET in every job instance which should
retain the constant delay contributed by the harmonic tasks
(or any potential delay contributed by other tasks). In contrast,
as introduced in Section V-B, with run-time variations, the
task’s execution times include variations that are drawn from a
normal distribution that gives a more realistic run-time result.
The results are plotted in Figure 8 and show that, without
run-time variations, the error ratio Eo is proportional to the
ratio of the constant delay caused by the harmonic tasks and
the observer task’s period To. The outliers for the triangular
points are the cases when there are other tasks contributing
to the start time delays within the tested attack duration (i.e.,
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Figure 9: The impact of the error ratio on the inference
precision. Each error ratio bin is the result of the 6000 task sets
(with harmonic tasks) with synthetically generated φ˜o from
{φo + (0.01x)To | 0 ≤ x ≤ 10 ∧ x ∈ Z}. It shows that the
error ratio has negative impact on the inference precision.
10 · LCM(To, Tv)). It is worth noting that only 6.75% of
the task sets have constant delay and Eo > 0 since the task
phases are randomly generated and hence it is not guaranteed
that the harmonic tasks can always interfere with the observer
task’s arrivals. This also indicates that having harmonic tasks
does not necessarily downgrade the proposed attack. On the
other hand, with execution time variations, the impact of the
constant start time delay is significantly reduced due to the
varied execution times. The DyPS algorithms yield better error
ratios in all of the 6000 task sets (88.4% of the task sets that
have Eo > 0 without run-time variations yield Eo = 0 with
run-time variations.)
To understand the impact of the error ratio of φ˜o on the in-
ference precision of φ˜v , we test the aforementioned 6000 task
sets with synthetically generated φ˜o from {φo + (0.01x)To |
0 ≤ x ≤ 10 ∧ x ∈ Z} which is expected to yield error
ratio in {0, 0.01, ..., 0.1}. This range is chosen based on the
experiment results shown in Figure 8 where overall error ratio
is smaller than 0.034 with run-time variations. The experiment
is carried out with a duration of 10 · LCM(To, Tv) and
with run-time variations enabled. Results shown in Figure 9
indicate that the error ratio has considerable negative impact
on the inference precision. For example, inference precision
I0v reduces to 0.79 when Eo = 0.01 from I0v = 0.98 when
Eo = 0. Nevertheless, considering only 0.7% of the task sets
have Eo > 0 due to the run-time variations and the varied task
phases, a high Eo is arguably uncommon in real cases.
2) Inferring The Victim Task’s Phase φv: We now focus
on evaluating the inference precision of φ˜v . Note that the
complete DyPS algorithms are tested in the experiments
here. That is, the φ˜o values are reconstructed as a part of
the algorithms during the experiments. We first examine the
impact of the attack duration on the attack results. We use
LCM(To, Tv) as an unit of the attack duration to evaluate
DyPS since the offset between the observer task and the
victim task repeats every LCM(To, Tv). A total of 6000
task sets are tested with the attack duration varying from
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Figure 10: The inference precision with varying attack du-
ration. The X-axis is the length of the attacks based on
LCM(To, Tv). It shows that the longer the attack persists the
higher inference precision DyPS can achieve.
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Figure 11: The impact of the number of tasks in a task set and
the task set utilization on the inference precision. Each grid
displays the mean inference precision for the corresponding
number of tasks (Y-axis) and task utilization (X-axis). A darker
grid shows a higher inference precision.
LCM(To, Tv) to 10 ·LCM(To, Tv) and the results are plotted
in Figure 10. As shown, a longer attack duration leads to
a higher inference precision. It is because more execution
intervals are reconstructed as the attack lasts longer. The
inference precision reaches Iov = 0.978 at 10 · LCM(To, Tv)
and plateaus afterward. Therefore, we choose to use an attack
duration of 10 · LCM(To, Tv) for the experiments presented
in this section unless otherwise stated.
Next we break down the number of tasks in a task set and
the task utilization to evaluate their impact on the inference
precision. The experiment results are plotted in Figure 11.
Each grid in the figure shows the mean inference precision
of 100 task sets with the corresponding number of tasks in a
task set and the task utilization. A brighter grid has a lower
inference precision while a darker grid indicates that the attack
yields a better inference precision. The resulting heat map
gives an intuition for the distribution of the inference precision
with varying number of tasks and the task utilization. The
figure shows a small degradation when the number of tasks in a
task set is high and the utilization is low. It is because a task set
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Figure 12: The inference precision with varying the DyPS
coverage ratio in the range of 0 < CDyPS < 1. It suggests
that the DyPS algorithms get better performance as the DyPS
coverage ratio increases. The DyPS algorithms perform better
than a random guess when CDyPS ≈ 0.
with a higher number of tasks can have more tasks preempting
and delaying the observer task’s execution and this introduces
more perturbations to the algorithms. On the other hand, a low
utilization implies a low execution time for the observer task
which results in shorter execution intervals to be reconstructed.
This fact makes it difficult to effectively eliminate false time
columns and leads to more scattered candidate time slots for
the last step of the algorithms, which causes more uncertainty
to the inferences.
3) Impact of DyPS Coverage Ratio: The DyPS coverage
ratio CDyPS represents the proportion of the time columns in
a schedule ladder diagram that can be covered by the observer
task’s execution. In the previous experiments with CDyPS ≥
1, we showed that the DyPS algorithms are able to yield
competitive inference precisions in various task set conditions.
Here, we evaluate the case when the DyPS coverage ratio is
less than one (i.e., 0 < CDyPS < 1.) In this experiment, we
generate 6000 task sets for each of the DyPS coverage ratio
groups from {[0.001+0.1·x, 0.1+0.1·x) | 0 ≤ x ≤ 9∧x ∈ Z}.
The mean inference precision is then taken from each DyPS
coverage ratio group and the results are plotted in Figure 12.
It shows that the DyPS algorithms get worse results as the
DyPS coverage ratio drops. When CDyPS ≈ 0, the DyPS
algorithms yield a inference precision (Iov = 0.61) that is close
to, but still better than, a random guess. Conversely, a higher
DyPS coverage ratio has better inference precision since the
observer task can cover more time columns on the schedule
ladder diagram and hence has a higher chance to encapsulate
the true time column.
4) Comparison with State-of-the-art (ScheduLeak): The
main challenge in attacking the EDF RTS is the existence of
the invalid part of the execution intervals. To understand the
impact on the state-of-the-art (i.e., ScheduLeak) algorithms
and how the DyPS algorithms handle such intervals, we test
both algorithms in the EDF RTS with 6000 newly generated
task sets (with Co > (To − Tv), task utilization drawn from
[0.001, 1.0)) in which the presence of the invalid execution
10
intervals is guaranteed. Results presented in Figure 1 show that
the DyPS algorithms outperform the ScheduLeak algorithms
in handling the invalid execution intervals. As the attack lasts
longer, more invalid execution intervals are collected in the
case of ScheduLeak that leads to worse inference precision.
The ScheduLeak algorithms yield a mean inference prevision
of 0.54 at 10 · LCM(To, Tv). This is only sightly better than
a naive attack with random guesses indicating ScheduLeak is
inadequate for attacking the EDF RTS.
VI. DISCUSSION
From the evaluation results, DyPS attacks perform well in
inferring the victim task’s phases and have similar performance
characteristics to ScheduLeak [12] under various task set
conditions. As a result, given the same task set, running
either FP scheduling or EDF scheduling does not seemn to
make a significant difference in terms of resisting the attacks.
However, the DyPS algorithms do require an extra step to
reconstruct the observer task’s phase before proceeding to
inferring the victim task’s phase, which is the crucial point
that distinguishes the scheduler side-channels in FP RTS and
EDF RTS. As analyzed in Section IV-A, the observer task
may suffer constant start time delays when there exist some
harmonic tasks that have ψ(τo, τi) = 1 and φi aligned with φo.
Having such tasks may lead to an inaccurate φ˜o and further
reduce the inference precision as evaluated in Section V-C1.
This offers one potential effective measure for defending EDF
RTS against the DyPS attack. Consequently, employing the
EDF scheduling alogrihtm and adjusting the task parameters
to satisfy the aforementioned conditions can be a simple yet
cost effective defense compared to the schedule obfuscation
techniques (proposed for, e.g., the FP scheduling [9] and
the time-triggered scheduling [10]) that require fundamental
changes in the design of the schedulers.
VII. RELATED WORK
Side-channels and covert-channels have been well studied in
many research domains. Typical side-channels such as cache
access time [19], power consumption traces [20], electro-
magnetic emanations [21], temperature [22], etc., may also
be seen against RTS. In this paper, we focus on scheduler-
based channels. Vo¨lp et al. [23] examined covert channels
between tasks with different priorities in the FP RTS. The
authors proposed to modify the scheduler to alter the task
that could potentially leak information with the idle task to
avoid such covert channels. Kadloor et al. [24] presented a
methodology for quantifying side-channel leakage for first-
come-first-serve and time-division-multiple-access schedulers.
Gong and Kiyavash [25] analyzed the deterministic work-
conserving schedulers and discovered a lower bound for the
total information leakage. There also has been other work on
covert channels and side-channels in RTS [26], [27], [28], [29].
In contrast to the above side-channels and the existing covert-
channels, this paper focuses on the scheduler side-channels in
which an unprivileged task is able to learn the behaviors of
others by simply analyzing its own execution.
There exists a line of work that focus on the scheduler
side-channels in RTS. Chen et al. [12] first introduced the
scheduler side-channels in preemptive FP RTS and proposed
the ScheduLeak algorithms that can extract valuable task
information from the system schedules at run-time with using
an unprivileged user-space task. Liu et al. [13] proposed a
method to obtain the task parameters (i.e., the victim task’s
period) that are required in the scheduler side-channel attacks.
Yoon et al. [9] attempted to close the scheduler side-channels
by introducing a randomization protocol that obfuscates the
schedules in the FP RTS. Based on this idea, Kru¨ger et al. [10]
proposed a combined online/offline randomization scheme
to reduce determinisms for time-triggered systems. Nasri
et al. [11] conducted a comprehensive study on the schedule
randomization protocol and argued that such techniques can
expose the FP RTS to more risks. While these work are
centered in the problem of the scheduler side-channels, none
of them focused on the dynamic-priority RTS and thus the
above defense techniques are inapplicable to preventing the
proposed DyPS attack.
There has been some work on security integration in
RTS [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35]. Most of the work
focused on defence techniques against general attacks. Some
researchers framed security in RTS as a scheduling prob-
lem [36], [37]. Hasan et al. [38] discussed the considerations
of scheduling security tasks in legacy RTS. This is further
extended to integrating security tasks into more general RTS
models [39], [40]. There exist another group of works focused
on hardening RTS from the architecture perspective. Mohan
et al. [41] proposed to use a disjoint, trusted hardware com-
ponent (i.e., FPGA) to monitor the behavior of a real-time
program running on an untrustworthy RTS. Yoon et al. [42]
created the SecureCore framework that utilizes one of the
cores in a multi-core processor as a trusted entity to carry out
various security checks for the activities observed from other
cores. Abdi et al. [43], [44] developed a restart-based approach
that uses a root-of-trust (i.e., a piece of hardware circuit)
and the trust zone technology to enforce the system reboot
process to evict any malicious dwellers when necessary. While
some of the techniques are useful for detecting anomalies and
mitigating the impact of the attacks, they do not close the
scheduler side-channels presented in this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Dynamic priority scheduling algorithms such as EDF are
able to better optimize the resources in the system (as com-
pared to FP schedulers). In addition, they also increase the
“dynamicism” in the system that can increase the difficulty
for would-be-attackers looking to leak critical information
via side-channels. Though not immune from such attacks,
employing harmonic tasks with certain characteristics seems
to have the potential to increase the difficulty for attackers.
Hence, an increased adoption of dynamic scheduler, along
with the aforementioned design choices, in RTS may aid in
improving the security posture of such systems.
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